On December 14, 2010, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction

and ordered as follows:

Pending final resolution of this matter, the U.S. Treasury Department, Alcohol and

Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (“TTB”) and their agents, servants, employees,

successors, representatives and assigns, and all others in active concert and privity

with them who receive actual notice of this Injunctive Order by personal service or

otherwise, are immediately restrained from enforcing the TTB’s September 30, 2010

Ruling No. 2010-4 and all requirements set forth therein.10

Defendants now ask the Court to clarify or modify, which the Court interprets as to alter

or amend, its preliminary injunction enjoining the TTB’s enforcement of the September 30, 2010

Ruling No. 2010-4 and all requirements set forth therein.

II. Law and Analysis

A court may grant a motion to alter or amend judgment if a clear error of law or newly

discovered evidence exists, an intervening change in controlling law occurs, or to prevent

manifest injustice. See Gencorp, Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th

Cir.1999). Such a motion is extraordinary and is seldom granted because it contradicts notions

of finality and repose. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Daniels, No. 1:05-CV-2573, 2007 WL 3104760,

at *1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2007) (citing Plaskon Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 904

F.Supp. 644, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1995)). “It is not the function of a motion to [alter or amend

judgment] either to renew arguments already considered and rejected by a court or ‘to proffer a

new legal theory or new evidence to support a prior argument when the legal theory or argument

could, with due diligence, have been discovered and offered during the initial consideration of

Case: 4:10-cv-02462-DDD Doc #: 45 Filed: 02/01/11 4 of 7. PageID #: 624

(4:10-CV-2462)

11 ECF No. 41 at 19-20.

12 ECF No. 42-1 at 3.

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the issue.’” McConocha v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 930 F.Supp. 1182, 1184

(N.D. Ohio 1996) (quoting In re August 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F.Supp. 1403, 1408 (S.D.

Ind.1994)).

As the Court wrote in its Order granting Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction:

The heart of this case is whether the TTB’s Ruling is considered interpretive or

legislative. If the Court finds the Ruling to be interpretive, then the Ruling does not

violate the Administrative Procedures Act. If the Ruling is legislative, then

Defendants have violated the APA upon issuing the Ruling. Plaintiffs RYO Machine

and Tobacco Outlet assert that the Ruling issued by the TTB violates the

Administrative Procedure Act, is ultra vires and otherwise unlawful. Defendants

contend that the Ruling at issue is interpretive rather than legislative in nature and

thus does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act and is otherwise lawful.11

Given that the question of the Ruling’s constitutionality remains unresolved, it defies common

sense to allow the TTB to enforce the Ruling (which may or may not be constitutionally valid)

upon those who wish to voluntarily submit themselves to the process set forth therein. The

Court’s injunction not only preserved the status quo for the Plaintiffs, but also any individual

who wishes to engage in similar business practices.

With respect to the Rule 59(e) criteria employed to determine whether to grant a request

to alter or amend judgment, it appears, without expressly stating, that Defendants seek only to

prevent manifest injustice. Defendants ask the Court to clarify its Order “to prevent any inequity

to retailers who may seek to challenge and/or comply with the Ruling.”12 Defendants have not

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(4:10-CV-2462)

13 To the extent Defendants assert that six applications filed with the TTB pursuant to the

Ruling is new evidence, those applications were submitted prior to the Courts Order granting the

preliminary injunction and could have been presented to the Court for consideration at that time.

Thus, these applications do not amount to newly discovered evidence.

14 ECF No. 42-1 at 3.

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claimed the existence of newly discovered evidence13, that the Court committed a clear error of

law or that there has been an intervening change in controlling law.

Defendants argue that “retailers could ultimately be unfairly prejudiced by the TTB’s

inability to process the applications if the TTB ultimately prevails in this litigation.”14 The

inverse, however, holds true as well. If the TTB does not ultimately prevail in this litigation,

retailers could be prejudiced for having expended the time and costs associated with the Ruling’s

procedures. Therefore, preserving the status quo for all, Plaintiffs and prospective retailers

engaged or looking to engage in a similar business, is best served by not altering the terms of the

injunction until resolution of the primary issue in this case—the Ruling’s constitutionality.

Accordingly, the Court finds no manifest injustice to prevent and therefore declines to

alter or amend its Order enjoining the TTB from enforcing Ruling 2010-4 issued on September

30, 2010.

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(4:10-CV-2462)

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III. Conclusion

For the above mentioned reasons, Defendants’ motion to alter or amend the Court’s

December 14, 2010 preliminary injunction order pursuant to Rule 59(e) (ECF No. 42) is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 Date   February 1, 2011

David D. Dowd, Jr.

U.S. District Judge